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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and attorney's fees, modernized the terminology, and purged the pro-
cedure of unneeded provisions so as to promote the "speedy determina-
tion of litigation on its merits." '12
DONALD J. BAUHS
Procedure: The Probable Cause Requirement of a Criminal
Complaint in Federal Court-In United States v. Greenberg,' a prose-
cution for income tax evasion was overturned on the ground that a
proper complaint had not been filed within the time allowed by the
statute of limitations. The complaint contained only the affidavit of
the Internal Revenue Agent. In it the affiant stated that:
... he had conducted an investigation of the federal income tax
liability of Hyman Greenberg for the calendar year 1955 and
other years; by examination of the said taxpayer's records; by
identifying and interviewing third parties with whom the said
taxpayer did business; by consulting public and private records
reflecting the said taxpayer's income; and by interviewing third
persons having knowledge of the said taxpayer's financial con-
dition.
2
The complaint also stated that based on this investigation, complainant
had personal knowledge that defendant had wilfully attempted to evade
and defeat a large part of his income tax. It also contained the dollar
amount of income shown on defendant's tax return and the figure which
represented defendant's alleged actual income.
The Government's argument was based on two main contentions:
(1) that since a summons rather than a warrant was issued on the
complaint, it was not necessary to show probable cause, and (2) that
even if probable cause were found to be a requirement, it had in fact
been shown.
The court disposed of the claim that probable cause need not be
shown when only a summons is sought. It reasoned that, as far as de-
fendant was concerned, it made little difference whether a warrant or
summons issued, since if he failed to respond to the summons a warrant
would issue. In addition the court noted that the specific language of
Rule 4(a)' of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not impose
a distinction in the requirements for securing a summons or a warrant.
12 WIS. STAT. §251.18 (1961).
1United States v. Greenberg, 320 F. 2d 467 (9th Cir. 1963).
2Id. at 468.
3 Rule 4 (a) : "Issuance. If it appears from the complaint that there is probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any
officer authorized by law to execute it. Upon the request of the attorney
for the government a summons instead of a warrant shall issue. More than
one warrant or summons may issue on the same complaint. If a defendant
fails to appear in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue."
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The court then determined that in this case probable cause had not been
shown.
Giordenello v. United States,4 the leading case in this area, has set
down what is required for a showing of probable cause and is quoted
from extensively in the Greenberg case. Since the court in Greenberg
relies so heavily on the exact language of Giordenello, it would be useful
to examine the latter before going into a discussion of the more specific
requirements enumerated in the Greenberg decision.
In Giordenello, petitioner was convicted of unlawfully purchasing
narcotics. He challenged the legality of his arrest and the admissibility
at the trial of the narcotics seized from his person upon arrest. Since
there was no search warrant, the seizure could be justified only as in-
cidental to a lawful arrest. The complaint stated:
That . . .Veto Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic
drugs, to-wit: heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful
importation; in violation of Section 174, Title 21, United States
Code.
And the complainant further states that he believes that
are material witnesses in relation to this
charge.5
Petitioner challenged the complaint as defective because it was based
on hearsay rather than personal knowledge, and because it recited no
more than the elements of the crime charged. The Supreme Court re-
fused to decide the hearsay issue because the complaint was defective
in not showing probable cause.
The rationale of the Giordenello case is based on the Court's in-
terpretation of Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, as read in the light of the Fourth Amendment. Rule 36 requires
that a complaint set forth the essential facts constituting the charge,
and Rule 47, that there be a showing of probable cause that the offense
has been committed and that defendant has committed it. The Court
concluded that the inference, resulting from a reading of the Rules and
the Amendment together, was that the purpose of the complaint was to
allow the magistrate to decide whether or not probable cause exists.
4 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1948).
5 Id. at 481.6 Rule 3. "The Complaint. The complaint is a written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a
commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with
offenses against the United States"
7 Rule 4: "Warrant or Summons Upon Complaint. (b) Form. (1) Warrant
The warrant shall be signed by the commissioner and shall contain the name
of the defendant or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which
he can be identified with reasonable certainty. It shall describe the offense
charged in the complaint. It shall command that the defendant be arrested
and brought before the nearest available commissioner. (2) Summons. The
summons shall be in the same form as the warrant except that it shall summon
the defendant to appear before a commissioner at a stated time and place."(See note 3 supra for sub-section (2)).
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The important thing is that the magistrate make his own decision and
not rely on the conclusions of the complainant. In the words of Johnson
v. United States, the inferences must ". .. be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." S
The complaint in Giordenello was adjudged defective because it con-
tained nothing from which the Commissioner could have reached his own
conclusion. The Court indicated that it is important for the complainant
to indicate the source of his belief. It also commented on the fact
that the complaint did not contain any allegation that the affiant spoke
with personal knowledge. Thus, while not deciding the issue squarely,
the Court seemed to indicate that the fact that personal knowledge,
rather than hearsay is relied on as a factor in favor of a complaint's
validity.
This examination of the general requirements of a complaint and
the allusion to the policy behind these requirements, as set forth in
Giordenello, when supplemented by an examination of the rather spe-
cific suggestions contained in Greenberg, indicates what a federal court
will require of a complaint. In Greenberg, the court made the following
criticisms and suggested how they could be remedied. The complainant
stated that he had examined defendant's records. Apparently this is not
a sufficient indication of the source of one's knowledge, for the court
indicated that he should have included the information obtained in the
examination. The complaint stated that third parties with whom the
taxpayer had done business were interviewed. The names of these
parties and the information obtained from them should have been in-
cluded. The complainant alleged that he had consulted public and pri-
vate records reflecting the taxpayer's income. The information obtained
from these consultations should have been set forth. The complaint
alleged that third persons having knowledge of taxpayer's financial
condition were interviewed. Information obtained from these inter-
views should have been included.
A brief glance at another recent case in this area should further
clarify the situation. In DiBella v. United States there was a proceed-
ing for suppression of evidence obtained by an allegedly unlawful search
and seizure. The complaint in this case alleged upon information and
belief that the defendants had unlawfully sold, dispensed, and distributed
heroin in packages not bearing tax stamps required by law. Sources
were specified as one of the defendants other witnesses, deponent's per-
sonal observations, and the reports and records of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics. This complaint was found insufficient as inadequately setting
forth the sources of information and grounds for belief. The court held
8 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
9 DiBella v. United States 284 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1960), reversed on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
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that there should have been some indication of exactly what deponent
had personally observed, what he had heard from others, and what he
had learned from the reports or records of the Bureau of Narcotics.
It seems that if the source is indicated in a way that will satisfy the
courts, that type of fact, generally known as evidentiary, must be
pleaded. That the defendant distributed narcotics is an ultimate fact.
The circumstances which enable one to make the assertion are evidenti-
ary facts, and it seems that this is what the courts require.
In conclusion, the policy which the courts seek to effectuate in en-
forcing the requirement of a showing of probable cause is one of re-
quiring the magistrate issuing the warrant or summons to come to his
own conclusions as to whether it (probable cause) exists. The purpose
is to place a barrier-presumably impartial-between the law enforce-
ment officer who might stand to gain by acquiring a warrant, and the
party whose arrest is sought. Obviously, a recital of the elements of the
crime and the fact that the defendant committed it is not going to be
enough. This is no more than stating a legal conclusion and is in-
sufficient even in a civil complaint. It helps if the complainant indicates
the sources of his belief. By doing this he necessarily brings in more
facts. However, even this will be insufficient if these sources are stated
generally as they vere in Greenberg and DiBella. One is drawn un-
avoidably to the conclusion that the courts, in no matter what terms they
state their criticisms, are all ultimately requiring evidentiary, as op-
posed to ultimate, facts or legal conclusions. This is the type of fact
specifically suggested in Greenberg. These facts by their nature allow
the magistrate to draw his own conclusion and thus fulfill the policy
the courts are trying to enforce. MARY C. CAHILL
Sales: What Constitutes Sufficient Notification for Breach of
Warranty-A tire purchased by plaintiff-Wojciuk from one of the
defendants, Stuewer, blew out, causing the automobile in which the
plaintiffs were riding to turn over. Plaintiff-wife suffered serious bodily
injuries. Defendant-Stuewer had told the plaintiffs that the tire would
never blow out, and advertisements also stated that the tire was guaran-
teed for life against any defects. On the day of the accident the plaintiff,
Wojciuk, telephoned defendant, Stuewer, and told him of the mishap,
saying, "Herb, what kind of tires did you sell me?.. .We had a blowout
and a terrible accident resulted from it."' The plaintiffs subsequently
brought suit against Stuewer for "breach of express warranty that the
tire would not blow out suddenly" and for "breach of implied warranty
of merchantable quality and fitness" in Woiciuk v. United States Rubber
'Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 235, 120 N.W. 2d 47,
53 (1963).
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